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“TEACHING” FORMATION OF PROFESSIONAL 
IDENTITY 
David I. C. Thomson 
INTRODUCTION 
In its landmark 2007 report on legal education, the Carnegie 
Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching focused its strongest 
criticism on the conclusion that law schools were not paying sufficient 
attention to the formation of professional identity in their students.1 This 
was a relatively new concept to legal educators, although one they may 
have addressed occasionally in some courses and clinical offerings.2 But 
the Carnegie Report put a spotlight on the obligation as follows: “Because 
it always involves social relationships with consequences, [law] practice 
ultimately depends on serious engagement with the meaning of the 
activities—in other words, with their moral bearing. For professionals, the 
decisive dimension is responsibility for clients and for the values the 
public has entrusted to the profession.”3 
It is instructive to remember that the Carnegie Report was part of a 
series of reports on education for the professions and included reports on 
the training of doctors, nurses, clergy, and engineers.4 In each report, 
Carnegie Foundation authors emphasized the professional formation of 
the student.5 However, perhaps because the legal profession already had 
a code of professional conduct6 and the ABA already required every law 
school to teach professional ethical rules,7 many legal educators did not 
understand what exactly was missing. As a result of the report 
encouraging the emphasis of professional identity formation in a 
                                                     
  Professor of Practice, University of Denver, Sturm College of Law. The author 
wishes to express his appreciation to Fred Cheever, Roberto Corrada, Bill Sullivan, Eli Wald, 
Marty Katz, Cliff Zimmerman, Daisy Hurst Floyd, Stephen Daniels, and Ben Madison for 
their feedback on this Article. Also, thanks to Diane Burkhardt, Colton Johnston, and Kelley 
Haun for their research assistance. Any errors are mine alone. © 2015 David I. C. Thomson, 
all rights reserved. 
1  See WILLIAM M. SULLIVAN ET AL., EDUCATING LAWYERS: PREPARATION FOR THE 
PROFESSION OF LAW 14 (2007) [hereinafter CARNEGIE REPORT]. 
2  See id. at 12–14. 
3  Id. at 11–12. 
4  Id. at 15. 
5  See Anne Colby & William M. Sullivan, Formation of Professionalism and Purpose: 
Perspectives from the Preparation for the Professions Program, 5 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 404, 
405, 410 (2008). 
6  See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT pmbl. para. 7 (2013). 
7  See 2014–2015 ABA STANDARDS FOR APPROVAL OF LAW SCH. Standard 303(a)(1) 
(2014). 
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curriculum that already had a required course dedicated to ethics, there 
was confusion. It did not help that the report unintentionally blurred the 
distinction between the required course in ethics (and its emphasis on the 
ethical rules) that has long been a part of legal education and the new 
concept introduced in the report: the formation of professional identity.8 It 
took legal educators some time to realize that, buried in the report, was a 
concept that was almost completely new to them. Many had little idea 
what it was, reduced as it was in their minds to the concept of 
professionalism; and, having scant understanding that it was something 
different, had done very little to address it in legal education. 
This Article is my attempt to provide a guide to what professional 
identity formation is—as distinct from more familiar concepts of 
professionalism and ethics—and what legal educators are doing, and 
could do in the future, to foster this sort of professional formation in their 
courses and curricula. In Part I, I offer some background and history of 
the topic, which supports a new definition provided in the Article for 
lawyer professional identity formation. I describe in Part II what some 
schools are doing to “teach” formation of professional identity and argue 
that those efforts have some significant limitations. I argue in Part III 
that teaching law through simulations can provide learning opportunities 
that foster professional identity formation and that these learning 
opportunities can be added to any course. Finally, in Part IV, I describe a 
particular course in civil discovery law that illustrates the concepts and 
arguments made in the Article. 
I. DEFINING PROFESSIONAL IDENTITY FORMATION 
A. What a Profession Is 
The concept of a “profession” started with medicine and dates back to 
the fifth century B.C.9 The medical profession was the first to combine 
promises of scientific expertise with individual moral commitments.10 
Interestingly (and appropriately, given how little about the human body 
was known), among those moral commitments were humility and a 
promise to learn from one’s and others’ mistakes.11 Even to the present 
day, the core of medical professional identity is found in what is known as 
the Hippocratic Oath, and most students recite the oath upon graduation 
                                                     
8  See CARNEGIE REPORT, supra note 1, at 129. 
9  See STEVEN H. MILES, THE HIPPOCRATIC OATH AND THE ETHICS OF MEDICINE 3, 
178 (2004). The Hippocratic Oath is an early embodiment of the concept of a profession. Id. 
at 3. 
10  See id. at 178. 
11  See id. at xiii–xiv (binding the physician to use his ability and judgment to keep 
patients from harm or injustice and guard life in a pure and holy way). 
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from medical school.12 A common misunderstanding about this oath is that 
it contains the words “first do no harm,”13 but those words were added to 
medical professional formation by a nineteenth century surgeon, Thomas 
Inman.14 The oath that dates back to Hippocrates does include the words 
“I will use regimens for the benefit of the ill in accordance with my ability 
and my judgment, but from [what is] to their harm or injustice I will keep 
[them],”15 but also includes two key formulations that will sound familiar 
to any legal educator today: that what is learned by the professional will 
be shared with the professional’s pupils, and that what is learned by the 
professional which is not proper to repeat will be kept confidential.16  
These concepts in the oath became part of a legacy, a basis of identity 
for medical professionals, and that legacy remains much so to this day.17 
The Hippocratic Oath created shared standards for moral behavior in the 
medical profession, even though it was not until 1847 that there was a 
published national code of ethics for doctors.18  
The root word of professional is profess, or to declare something in 
public.19 The dictionary definition of that word is: “to declare or admit 
openly or freely: affirm.”20 A group of people who declare principles to 
which they will adhere constitutes a profession, and each professional 
thereby limits his options and behaves in conformance with the declared 
set of values. Lawyers, of course, declare openly that they will adhere to 
the Rules of Professional Conduct, the ethical standards of the legal 
profession.21 Roscoe Pound defined a profession as a group “pursuing a 
                                                     
12  Raphael Hulkower, The History of the Hippocratic Oath: Outdated, Inauthentic, 
and Yet Still Relevant, 25/26 EINSTEIN J. BIOLOGY & MED. 41, 41 (2010). 
13  Daniel K. Sokol, “First Do No Harm” Revisited, BMJ (Oct. 25, 2013), 
http://www.bmj.com/content/347/bmj.f6426; JACALYN DUFFIN, HISTORY OF MEDICINE: A 
SCANDALOUSLY SHORT INTRODUCTION 103 (2d ed. 2010) (noting that this is the translation 
of the commonly used Latin phrase “primum non nocere”). 
14  See Sokol, supra note 13. 
15  MILES, supra note 9, at xiii (alteration in original). 
16  See id. at xiii–xiv. 
17  See Hippocratic Oath, Modern Version, GUIDES JOHNS HOPKINS U., 
http://guides.library.jhu.edu/c.php?g=202502&p=1335759 (last visited Apr. 10, 2015). 
18  History of AMA Ethics, AM. MED. ASS’N, http://www.ama-assn.org/ama/pub/about-
ama/our-history/history-ama-ethics.page (last visited Apr. 10, 2015); see also COUNCIL ON 
ETHICAL & JUD. AFF., AM. MED. ASS’N, CODE OF MEDICAL ETHICS (2015), available at 
http://www.ama-assn.org/ama/pub/physician-resources/medical-ethics/code-medical-
ethics.page. 
19  MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 928 (10th ed. 2001). 
20  Id. 
21  See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT pmbl. (2013). The ABA requires law schools 
to teach students these standards, and many lawyers swear an oath when admitted to the 
bar. See 2014–2015 ABA STANDARDS FOR APPROVAL OF LAW SCH. Standard 303(a)(1) (2014); 
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learned art as a common calling in the spirit of a public service—no less a 
public service because it may incidentally be a means of livelihood.”22 So 
lawyering is done as a “common calling”—we do it in common, and we are 
“called” to work in “the spirit of public service.” The question then 
becomes: What are the standards for moral behavior in service to the 
public for lawyers? Is it simply the ethical standards we have, or is it 
something more? And if it is something more, what does that mean for us 
as legal educators? Formal legal education has been criticized for being 
disconnected from the profession nearly since its inception, and a brief 
study of the more recent criticism might help to answer those questions. 
B. The MacCrate Report 
Legal education has been criticized for over 100 years,23 but in the 
last twenty years or so, a series of reports has contained criticism and 
suggestions for improvement. The first report of the modern era was 
issued in 1992 by a panel of practicing lawyers and legal educators 
brought together in 1989 by the Council of the Section of Legal Education 
and Admissions to the Bar at the American Bar Association.24 The 
colloquial name for this report comes from the chair of that panel, Robert 
MacCrate, a prominent attorney in New York.25 The MacCrate Report 
offered a list of ten “Skills” and four “Values” that it concluded were 
fundamental to proper training for the practice of law.26 This list became 
a guideline for curricular reform at many law schools in the 1990s, and in 
particular, was the genesis of significant growth in the clinical legal 
education movement.27 However, much of that growth was focused on the 
ten lawyering skills that MacCrate listed, which included problem solving; 
legal research, analysis, and reasoning; written and oral communication; 
client counseling; negotiation; and recognizing and resolving ethical 
                                                     
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT pmbl. (2013); Carol Rice Andrews, The Lawyer’s Oath: 
Both Ancient and Modern, 22 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 3, 44–57 (2009). 
22  ROSCOE POUND, THE LAWYER FROM ANTIQUITY TO MODERN TIMES 5 (1953). 
23  See JOSEF REDLICH, THE COMMON LAW AND THE CASE METHOD IN AMERICAN 
UNIVERSITY LAW SCHOOLS v (1914); ALFRED ZANTZINGER REED, TRAINING FOR THE PUBLIC 
PROFESSION OF THE LAW xiv–xv (1921). 
24  Task Force on Law Sch. & the Profession: Narrowing the Gap, Legal Education & 
Professional Development–An Educational Continuum, 1992 A.B.A. SEC. LEGAL EDUC. & 
ADMISSIONS TO B., at xi–xiv (1992) [hereinafter MacCrate Report]. 
25  See A Survey of Law School Curricula: 2002–2010, 2012 A.B.A. SEC. LEGAL EDUC. 
& ADMISSIONS TO B. 13 n.1 (2012) [hereinafter 2002–2010 A.B.A. Curricular Survey]. 
26  See MacCrate Report, supra note 24, at 138–41. 
27  See Wallace Loh, Introduction: The MacCrate Report—Heuristic or Prescriptive?, 
69 WASH. L. REV. 505, 514–15 (1994); see also Bryant G. Garth, From MacCrate to Carnegie: 
Very Different Movements for Curricular Reform, 17 J. LEGAL WRITING INST. 261, 264 (2011). 
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dilemmas.28 The MacCrate Report had significant impact on the 
development and expansion of clinical legal education, as well as the 
expansion of skills classes.29 Less noticed, and less implemented, was the 
“Values” portion of the recommendations. 
The MacCrate Report endorsed four “Fundamental Values of the 
Profession”: 1) Provision of Competent Representation; 2) Striving to 
Promote Justice, Fairness, and Morality; 3) Striving to Improve the 
Profession; and 4) Professional Self-Development.30 
Much of law school is focused on the first value: competent 
representation.31 But there is much else of importance in this list. There 
is a reference to the morality of the profession, and the list includes such 
goals as promoting justice and fairness, a commitment to improvement of 
the profession, as well as one’s own professional self-development.32 
Because the primary focus of law school is on learning the law to represent 
the interests of a client,33 what remains in this list of professional values 
are only occasionally or indirectly addressed.  
C. The Carnegie Report 
Starting in the late 1990s, the Carnegie Foundation for the 
Advancement of Teaching initiated a wide-ranging study of professional 
education in several fields.34 The project, called Preparation for the 
Professions, included studies of medical, clergy, engineering, and legal 
education, and each project issued an extensive report.35 The report on 
legal education, entitled Educating Lawyers: Preparation for the 
Profession of Law, was published in 2007.36 After nearly 100 years of 
critical reports on the form and structure of legal education, just eight 
years after its publication, the Carnegie Report’s influence has already 
been significant. Numerous conferences dedicated to the study and 
                                                     
28  MacCrate Report, supra note 24, at 138–40. 
29  See Garth, supra note 27. 
30  MacCrate Report, supra note 24, at 140–41. 
31  See id. at 210–12 (noting that the goal of competent representation is recognized 
in the ABA’s Model Rules of Professional Conduct and the ABA’s Code of Professional 
Conduct). 
32  MacCrate Report, supra note 24, at 140–41. 
33  See 2014–2015 ABA STANDARDS FOR APPROVAL OF LAW SCH. Standard 302 (2014). 
34  See Neil Hamilton, Fostering Professional Formation (Professionalism): Lessons 
from the Carnegie Foundation’s Five Studies on Educating Professionals, 45 CREIGHTON L. 
REV. 763, 765 (2012). 
35  CARNEGIE REPORT, supra note 1, at 15. For a brief description of these reports, see 
Hamilton, supra note 34, at 769–71. 
36  See generally CARNEGIE REPORT, supra note 1. 
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discussion of the report have been held,37 significant adjustments have 
been made throughout legal education that were obviously influenced by 
the report,38 and at least three initiatives have been dedicated to 
promoting one or more of the principles described in the report.39 
The three principal contributions of the Carnegie Report were: first, 
that it identified the “three apprenticeships” of effective legal training;40 
second, that it argued persuasively in favor of the integration of all three 
apprenticeships throughout legal education;41 and third, that it brought 
attention to the importance of professional identity formation.42 The three 
apprenticeships it identified in the report were: (1) the cognitive, (2) the 
practical, and (3) the ethical-social.43 The cognitive apprenticeship focuses 
on what has long been referred to as “thinking like a lawyer.”44 The 
practical apprenticeship focuses on practical lawyering skills and harkens 
back to the list of skills in the MacCrate Report.45 The ethical-social 
apprenticeship focuses on the formation of the student as a professional 
attorney.46 
The Carnegie Report found that law schools were generally effective, 
particularly in the first year, inculcating in students the principles of the 
first apprenticeship through the case method of study, which it called the 
“signature pedagog[y]” in law school.47 Concerning the practical 
apprenticeship, the report expressed concern that there was not enough 
teaching of legal doctrine in the context of practice, noting that “[w]ith 
little or no direct exposure to the experience of practice, students have 
slight basis on which to distinguish between the demands of actual 
                                                     
37  Comm. on the Prof’l Educ. Continuum, Twenty Years After the MacCrate Report: A 
Review of the Current State of the Legal Education Continuum and the Challenges Facing 
the Academy, Bar, and Judiciary, 2013 A.B.A. SEC. LEGAL EDUC. & ADMISSIONS TO B. 18–19 
(2013). 
38  See id. at 5. 
39  See generally EDUCATING TOMORROW’S LAW., 
http://educatingtomorrowslawyers.du.edu (last visited Apr. 10, 2015) (labeling itself an 
initiative of the Institute for the Advancement of the American Legal System (IAALS) at the 
University of Denver); HOLLORAN CENTER FOR ETHICAL LEADERSHIP PROFS., 
https://www.stthomas.edu/hollorancenter/ (last visited Apr. 10, 2015) (labeling itself an 
initiative of St. Thomas Law School); PARRIS INST. FOR PROF. FORMATION, 
http://law.pepperdine.edu/parris-institute/ (last visited Apr. 10, 2015) (labeling itself an 
initiative of Pepperdine School of Law). 
40  CARNEGIE REPORT, supra note 1, at 27. 
41  See id. at 28–29. 
42  See id. at 14. 
43  See id. at 28. 
44  Id. 
45  Id.; see MacCrate Report, supra note 24, at 135. 
46  CARNEGIE REPORT, supra note 1, at 28. 
47  See id. at 2, 23–28. 
2015] “TEACHING” FORMATION OF PROFESSIONAL IDENTITY 309 
practice and the peculiar requirements of law school.”48 In this way, the 
Carnegie Report refocused attention on skills needed for practice, as the 
MacCrate Report did before it.49 
However, the Carnegie Report reserved its greatest criticism of legal 
education for the lack of intentional development of its students in the 
third apprenticeship, the ethical-social, which it also referred to as the 
students’ formation of professional identity as a lawyer.50 In recent years, 
conferences and commentators have begun to focus on this 
apprenticeship—what it means and what sorts of adjustments to legal 
education might be needed to address it.51 Bryant Garth, former Director 
of the American Bar Foundation and dean at two law schools, has 
suggested that this recommendation, and the changes it will bring if taken 
seriously, may have an even more profound impact on legal education 
than the MacCrate Report has.52 
Among the Carnegie Report’s most important recommendations were 
that the three apprenticeships should be integrated throughout the law 
school course of study, and that paying greater attention to the third 
                                                     
48  Id. at 95. 
49  Compare id. (noting that the key to becoming an effective legal problem-solver is 
practicing legal problem-solving in real or hypothetical situations), with MacCrate Report, 
supra note 24, at 138–40 (identifying ten fundamental lawyering skills). 
50  See CARNEGIE REPORT, supra note 1. The Carnegie Report likely used the word 
“identity” quite intentionally. The psychologist Erik Erikson developed the concept of 
identity in the middle of the twentieth century. HOWARD GARDNER ET AL., GOOD WORK: 
WHEN EXCELLENCE AND ETHICS MEET 11 (2001). Identity has been defined as a combination 
of “a person’s deeply felt convictions about who she is, and what matters most to her 
existence as a worker, a citizen, and a human being.” Id. Contemporaries summarized 
Erikson’s theory of identity formation as follows: “Each person’s identity is shaped by an 
amalgam of forces, including family history, religious and ideological beliefs, community 
membership, and idiosyncratic individual experiences.” Id. 
51  For example, the first annual conference of the Educating Tomorrow’s Lawyers 
initiative of IAALS, which took place September 27–29, 2012, was thematically focused on 
the third apprenticeship. See Event: The Development of Professional Identity, EDUCATING 
TOMORROW’S LAW., http://educatingtomorrowslawyers.du.edu/events/the-development-of-
professional-identity-in-legal-education-rethinking-lear/program/ (last visited Apr. 10, 
2015). This Article comes out of a presentation made by the author with Bill Sullivan on 
September 28, 2012, at that conference. Also, at the Southeast Association of Law Schools 
(SEALS) 2014 Conference, a three-hour discussion group of ten law faculty addressed itself 
to a detailed discussion of the third apprenticeship and prepared short papers on the subject 
in advance. See Seals 2014 Conference Program, SEALS, http://sealslawschools.org/
submissions/program/pastprograms.asp?confyear=2014 (last visited Apr. 10, 2015). In 
addition, I participated in this symposium entirely devoted to professional identity hosted 
by Regent University School of Law on October 5, 2014. See Regent University Law Review 
Symposium Presenters, REGENT U. SCH. L., http://www.regent.edu/acad/schlaw/student_life/
studentorgs/lawreview/symposiumparticipants.cfm (last visited Apr. 10, 2015). 
52  See Garth, supra note 27, at 267. 
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apprenticeship could help facilitate that integration.53 Even the report 
itself mentions the potential power of law schools paying significant 
attention to the third apprenticeship: “The third element of the 
framework—professional identity—joins the first two elements and is, we 
believe, the catalyst for an integrated legal education.”54 The report 
criticized the typical law school curriculum as being too separated 
between doctrine and skills and recommended that law schools make an 
effort to integrate all three apprenticeships into their curricula.55  
A more adequate and properly formative legal education requires a 
better balance among the cognitive, practical, and ethical-social 
apprenticeships. To achieve this balance, legal educators will have to do 
more than shuffle the existing pieces. The problem demands their 
careful rethinking of both the existing curriculum and the pedagogies 
that law schools employ to produce a more coherent and integrated 
initiation into a life in the law.56 
Unfortunately, as the Carnegie Report also notes, “in most law schools, 
the apprenticeship of professionalism and purpose is subordinated to the 
cognitive, academic apprenticeship.”57 
As we develop our thinking about professional identity formation, 
however, we should be explicit about what it means. Since the Carnegie 
Report was published, the terms “professionalism” and “professional 
identity” have been confused with each other, and yet, they are mostly 
different concepts.58 While there is some overlap between them, each 
contains components that are distinct from the other. The Carnegie Report 
uses this language to describe professional identity formation: “Th[e] 
apprenticeship of professional identity . . . . include[s] conceptions of the 
personal meaning that legal work has for practicing attorneys and their 
sense of responsibility toward the profession.”59 
So we know that the original idea included concepts of “personal 
meaning” and “responsibility.” Further, the report argued that learning 
how to balance the competing interests in legal representation was critical 
to our students’ formation:  
                                                     
53  CARNEGIE REPORT, supra note 1, at 28. 
54  Id. at 14 (emphasis added). 
55  See id. at 27–29. 
56  Id. at 147. 
57  Id. at 132–33. 
58  Compare Martin J. Katz, Teaching Professional Identity in Law School, COLO. 
LAW., Oct. 2013, at 45, 45 (explaining that professional identity includes “more than simply 
ethics or professionalism—or even both together”), with Donald Burnett, A Pathway of 
Professionalism—The First Day of Law School at the University of Idaho, ADVOCATE, Feb. 
2009, at 17, 18 (using the words “professional identity” and “professionalism” synonymously). 
59  CARNEGIE REPORT, supra note 1, at 132. 
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[L]egal education needs to attend very seriously to its apprenticeship of 
professional identity. . . . [S]tudents’ great need is to begin to develop 
the knowledge and abilities that can enable them to understand and 
manage these tensions in ways that will sustain their professional 
commitment and personal integrity over the course of their careers.60 
As a way of underscoring this important subject, the report argued 
that it was one with far-reaching consequences: 
Insofar as law schools choose not to place ethical-social values within 
the inner circle of their highest esteem and most central preoccupation, 
and insofar as they fail to make systematic efforts to educate toward a 
central moral tradition of lawyering, legal education may inadvertently 
contribute to the demoralization of the legal profession and its loss of a 
moral compass . . . .61 
In a book about undergraduate business education that he co-authored, 
William Sullivan, lead author of the Carnegie Report, said this about 
ethical formation in that context: 
[U]nless this rigorous thinking is directed toward some committed 
purpose, it can lead to relativism or cynicism—or at least to a narrowly 
instrumental orientation. 
A strong education in Analytical Thinking and Multiple Framing 
without attention to meaning can teach students to formulate and 
critique arguments, but this very facility can make it hard for them to 
find any firm place to stand. For this reason, Analytical Thinking and 
Multiple Framing need to be grounded in and guided by the third mode 
of thought in liberal learning—the Reflective Exploration of Meaning, 
which engages students with questions such as “What do I really believe 
in, what kind of person do I want to be, what kind of world do I want to 
live in, and what kind of contribution can I make to that world?” Lack 
of attention to this third mode is a dangerous limitation, especially 
when students are preparing for work that has important implications 
for the welfare of society.62  
D. Lawyer Professional Identity Defined 
Having examined the Carnegie Report closely, we know that the 
concepts behind the third apprenticeship include: personal meaning in the 
work, responsibility to the profession and society, and personal integrity.63 
Unfortunately, while introducing a potentially quite valuable concept into 
legal education, the Carnegie Report also adds some confusion to the 
                                                     
60  Id. at 128. 
61  Id. at 140. 
62  ANNE COLBY ET AL., RETHINKING UNDERGRADUATE BUSINESS EDUCATION 79 
(2011). 
63  CARNEGIE REPORT, supra note 1, at 132. 
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difference between this new concept and the traditional concept of 
professional ethics as studied in law school.64 
Part of this confusion comes simply through the various terms the 
report uses for the third apprenticeship. Chapter four of the report is 
focused on this subject, and there are references to the “[a]pprenticeship 
of [i]dentity and [p]urpose,” the “apprenticeship of professional identity,” 
the “apprenticeship of professionalism and purpose,” and the “ethical-
social apprenticeship.”65 Further, there is confusion between the terms 
“professionalism” and “professional identity.”66 Is professional identity 
formation simply the same as professionalism? Or does it merely refer to 
the identity of being a professional attorney? 
Professor W. Bradley Wendel believes there is no difference between 
the two concepts. In his critique of the Carnegie Report, he states that the 
professional identity of lawyers is described “simply [as] performing the 
complex task of representing clients effectively within the bounds of the 
law.”67 He believes that law professors should just “continue teaching their 
students to be good lawyers.”68 
In his critique, he uses the example of John Yoo, an attorney for the 
Office of Legal Counsel in the U.S. Department of Justice during the early 
days after the September 11th terrorist attacks on the United States.69 
Mr. Yoo (now Professor Yoo at Berkeley Law School) was the primary 
author of what has since become known as the “Torture Memos,” which 
provided legal justification to the administration of President George W. 
Bush to torture prisoners of war.70 Critiques of the memos have focused 
on the immorality of torture, and have suggested that a lawyer acting 
morally would not have written them.71 Professor Wendel believes that 
the law contains internal logic and that a significant part of what it means 
to be a lawyer is to be loyal to the law.72 Quite apart from the immorality 
of torture, the conclusion of the memos was “flawed as legal advice” 
                                                     
64  See sources cited supra note 58. 
65  CARNEGIE REPORT, supra note 1, at 132. 
66  See sources cited supra note 58. 
67  W. Bradley Wendel, Should Law Schools Teach Professional Duties, Professional 
Virtues, or Something Else? A Critique of the Carnegie Report on Educating Lawyers, 9 U. 
ST. THOMAS L.J. 497, 498 (2011). 
68  Id. at 501. 
69  See id. at 503 n.27. 
70  Robert Bejesky, An Albatross for the Government Legal Advisor Under MRPC Rule 
8.4, 57 HOW. L.J. 181, 182–85 (2013). 
71  See, e.g., Milan Markovic, Can Lawyers Be War Criminals?, 20 GEO. J. LEGAL 
ETHICS 347, 355–56 (2007) (claiming that the Torture Memo authors were accomplices to 
torture). 
72  See Wendel, supra note 67, at 498, 501. 
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because the law does not allow torture.73 Yoo was therefore a poor lawyer 
and displayed disloyalty to the law in claiming otherwise.74 In other words, 
all the professional identity in the world would not have helped; what was 
needed was a better adherence to the craft of lawyering. 
The views of Professor Wendel about professional identity of lawyers 
are in opposition to those of Professor David Luban, and these two 
professors have had a back-and-forth scholarly discussion about the 
relationship between morality and the duties of a lawyer for over a 
decade.75 Luban notes that Wendel takes the view that a lawyer should 
“recognize professional duties as obligations of political morality, not 
individual morality.”76 Luban’s view is that, however difficult it might be 
at times, a lawyer must still consider matters of justice and individual 
morality.77 
Professor Eli Wald believes that the ABA Model Rules of Professional 
Conduct have what he calls a “hired gun bias” and that they should be 
refocused to emphasize the role of lawyers as officers of the legal system 
and public citizens, going so far as to suggest that the preamble to the 
Model Rules should be rewritten as follows: “A lawyer is a public citizen, 
an officer of the legal system and a representative of clients.”78 Further, 
Professor Wald argues that the Model Rules ought to be rewritten to 
reflect the commitment of the Model Rules to form lawyers whose 
professional identity is more complex than mere servants of client 
interests.79 
Professors Ben Madison and Natt Gantt offer the following definition 
of the professional identity of a lawyer: 
[P]rofessionalism[’s] . . . focus historically has been on the outward 
conduct the legal profession desires its members to exhibit. 
. . . Professional identity [, however, ] encompasses the manner in which 
a lawyer internalizes values such that, for instance, she views herself 
as a civil person who treats others with civility and respect even in hotly 
disputed matters.80 
                                                     
73  Id. at 502. 
74  See id. at 503 n.27. 
75  See, e.g., David Luban, How Must a Lawyer Be? A Response to Woolley and Wendel, 
23 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1101 (2010); Alice Woolley & W. Bradley Wendel, Legal Ethics and 
Moral Character, 23 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1065 (2010).  
76  Luban, supra note 75, at 1102 (citing Woolley & Wendel, supra note 75, at 1098). 
77  See id. at 1116–17. 
78  Eli Wald, Resizing the Rules of Professional Conduct, 27 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 227, 
266 (2014). 
79  See id. 
80  Benjamin V. Madison, III & Larry O. Natt Gantt, II, The Emperor Has No Clothes, 
but Does Anyone Really Care? How Law Schools Are Failing to Develop Students’ Professional 
Identities and Practical Judgment, 27 REGENT U. L. REV. 337, 344–45 (2015). 
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Professor Daisy Hurst Floyd has proposed another definition: 
“Professional identity refers to the way that a lawyer integrates the 
intellectual, practical, and ethical aspects of being a lawyer and also 
integrates personal and professional values. A lawyer with an ethical 
professional identity is able to exercise practical wisdom and to live a life 
of satisfaction and well-being.”81 
Returning to the Carnegie Report, it offers a prescription that may be 
helpful in the context of this brief review of competing views of lawyer 
professional identity: 
Law school graduates who enter legal practice also need the capacity to 
recognize the ethical questions their cases raise, even when those 
questions are obscured by other issues and therefore not particularly 
salient. They need wise judgment when values conflict, as well as the 
integrity to keep self-interest from clouding their judgment.82 
Some key terms in this prescription are worth highlighting: “ethical 
questions their cases raise,” “wise judgment when values conflict,” and 
“integrity to keep self-interest from clouding their judgment.”83 
It is possible for all these competing views and definitions to be 
reconciled. Doing so, however, will require that we separate the terms 
“professionalism” and “professional identity.” It is important that we do 
this because, while the ethical rules include value judgments,84 they are 
rules, and as such, are amenable to bad lawyering.85 The values of the 
profession, however, are not fully contained in the ethical rules, and where 
they are addressed, they often reflect historical values that may be 
antiquated or include some undesirable values the profession ought to 
rethink.86 Those values may be difficult to achieve, but that does not mean 
it is impossible or unrealistic.87 The Carnegie Report suggests that even 
though we have ethical rules that govern our behaviors, something is still 
missing, or at least sufficient focus on that something has been lost.88 
While there is some overlap existing between the two concepts, these 
concepts are separable, and there is value in articulating two separate 
                                                     
81  Daisy Hurst Floyd, Practical Wisdom: Reimagining Legal Education, 10 U. ST. 
THOMAS L.J. 195, 201–02 (2012). 
82  CARNEGIE REPORT, supra note 1, at 146. 
83  Id. 
84  See Andrew B. Ayers, What If Legal Ethics Can’t Be Reduced to a Maxim?, 26 GEO. 
J. LEGAL ETHICS 1, 2 (2013).  
85  See Wendel, supra note 67, at 518 (describing the Holmesian bad man approach to 
legal ethics). 
86  See Wald, supra note 78, at 256 (explaining that the underlying assumptions of the 
Model Rules of Professional Conduct are inconsistent with the profession as a whole). 
87  See Luban, supra note 75, at 1102 (arguing that mere difficulty is an insufficient 
reason to reject the conception of “moral agency”). 
88  See CARNEGIE REPORT, supra note 1, at 127. 
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definitions and goals in this work and in our teaching. Therefore, this 
Article offers the following formulation of professionalism: 
“Professionalism relates to the ethical rules (the line below which we 
cannot stray) as well as behaviors, such as thoroughness, respect and 
consideration for one’s clients and towards opposing counsel and judges, 
and responding to client needs in a timely fashion.” 
Remember that the Carnegie Report suggests that law schools are not 
giving sufficient attention to the formation of professional identity in law 
school.89 But it could not have been referring to the concepts included in 
this definition of professionalism; we teach these concepts pretty well in 
law school, not only in the ethics course, but also across the curriculum. 
Arguably, we could be more intentional about how and when we do this, 
but throughout the curriculum, beyond the required ethics course, we 
expect certain behaviors from our students. Often we define them in our 
course policy documents, and certainly they are defined in our student 
handbooks and honor codes.90 We expect certain behaviors, and for the 
most part we get them. We could doubtless do a better job of engendering 
consideration for diverse clients and diverse client perspectives, but this 
is becoming a more intentional part of clinical pedagogy, as well as all 
forms of experiential learning.91 
If that is an acceptable definition of professionalism—at least for the 
purpose of defining the goals for legal education—what is the Carnegie 
Report referring to when it argues in favor of law schools being more 
intentional about the work they do with their students in helping them to 
form a professional identity? This Article offers the following definition of 
professional identity for lawyers: “Professional identity relates to one’s 
own decisions about professional behaviors ‘above the line,’ as well as a 
sense of duty as an officer of the legal system and responsibility as part of 
a system in our society that is engaged in preserving, maintaining, and 
upholding the rule of law.” 
The reason for the “above the line” distinction in this definition is 
this: no one goes to law school to learn how to violate the ethical rules.92 
                                                     
89  See id. 
90  See generally, e.g., Academic Honor Code, BERKELEY L., 
http://www.law.berkeley.edu/819.htm (last visited Apr. 10, 2015); Honor Code, STANFORD U., 
https://studentaffairs.stanford.edu/communitystandards/policy/honor-code (last visited Apr. 
10, 2015). 
91  See Mary Lynch, The Importance of Experiential Learning for Development of 
Essential Skills in Cross-Cultural and Intercultural Effectiveness, 1 J. EXPERIENTIAL 
LEARNING 129, 131–32 (2015).  
92  No rational student would spend the tuition and attendant costs to attend law 
school just to run the risk of being disbarred and losing all of that investment. 
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Students want to know what is expected of them as professionals.93 And 
not all situations—indeed precious few of them in day-to-day practice—
require that the attorney takes a position that is right on the ethical line.94 
So professional identity must involve personal decisions of where the 
attorney will apply his judgment to decide how to resolve particular 
ethical matters that reside “above the line.”95 Such decisions obviously 
involve both matters of morality and matters of identity. 
And so then the concept of teaching professional identity means we 
want our students to experience making these sorts of decisions while they 
are still in law school so they have some idea of how they would resolve 
them when they arise in practice. When we say we “teach” professional 
identity, it means we ask our students to finish this sentence: “I am a 
lawyer, and that means for me that I will resolve this above the line ethical 
dilemma as follows . . . .” The Carnegie Report is probably correct when it 
says most law schools do not teach that—or when they do, not 
intentionally or very well—across the curriculum.96 
II. “TEACHING” PROFESSIONAL IDENTITY 
A. Is This Something We Can Teach? 
With the emerging consensus that these are things we should teach 
our students comes the companion view that this is something we can 
teach. Indeed, “[t]he predominant view among legal educators is no longer 
that students can learn professional values by osmosis or on the job 
training. We have to teach it in law school.”97 A recent panel at the annual 
conference of the Association of American Law Schools (AALS) was 
entitled “Incorporating Teaching Professional Identity into the Legal 
                                                     
93  See Helia Garrido Hull, Legal Ethics for the Millennials: Avoiding the Compromise 
of Integrity, 80 UMKC L. REV. 271, 272–73 (2011) (noting stories of lawyers facing discipline 
or disbarment for lack of professionalism); Sabrina C. Narain, A Failure to Instill Realistic 
Ethical Values in New Lawyers: The ABA and Law School’s Duty to Better Prepare Lawyers 
for Real Life Practice, 41 W. ST. U. L. REV. 411, 415–16 (2014) (noting that most professional 
responsibility courses focus on the “basic framework to avoid malpractice liability and 
disciplinary actions by the state bar”). 
94  See Luban, supra note 75, at 1116 (“By and large, lawyers do not go frantically 
through life encountering one moral dilemma after another like challenges in a video 
game.”). 
95  Because this part of the definition incorporates the ethical rules, it is the place of 
overlap between the two concepts of “Professionalism” and “Professional Identity.” 
96  CARNEGIE REPORT, supra note 1, at 14, 146–47. 
97  Alison Donahue Kehner & Mary Ann Robinson, Mission: Impossible, Mission: 
Accomplished or Mission: Underway? A Survey and Analysis of Current Trends in 
Professionalism Education in American Law Schools, 38 U. DAYTON L. REV. 57, 99 (2012). 
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Education Curriculum.”98 Law professors are a confident and hard-
working bunch, and there is a broad assumption that this is something we 
can teach. 
The problem for us as teachers is that formation of a student’s 
identity is not directly “teachable,” at least not in the didactic sense. As 
we have seen, professional formation in law happens in the context of 
work that is important for the welfare of society, and it involves judgment 
and concepts of one’s personal identity as a human being and as a citizen 
and member of that society.99 Because the subject is so personal to each 
student, the answers to such questions as “What do I really believe in?” 
and “What kind of a person do I want to be?” and, gradually, “What kind 
of a lawyer do I want to be?” are not something we can “teach,” at least 
not through the methods common to law school classrooms.100 We cannot 
effectively teach someone to answer such questions in the abstract. When 
we try to do that, we usually receive tentative answers disconnected from 
the legal context that animates them. The context and the value 
judgments students make are the bases from which they will form their 
professional identity as lawyers.101  
We must also remember that all students come to law school with 
different backgrounds and educational experiences, all of which have 
formed them as human beings. Instead of thinking that ethical formation 
is something we can do for our students didactically—teaching in the 
standing-behind-the-podium sense—law faculty need to do something 
else. We need a pedagogical method by which we might address the third 
apprenticeship throughout the curriculum.102 It is likely this will be 
something different than the familiar one-to-many classroom framework 
in which we are most comfortable. 
                                                     
98  Final Program at Association of American Law Schools 2015 Annual Meeting: 
Legal Education at the Crossroads 10 (Jan. 2–5, 2015), available at https://www.aals.org/wp-
content/uploads/2014/12/Program_Final.pdf. 
99  Nelson P. Miller, An Apprenticeship of Professional Identity: A Paradigm for 
Educating Lawyers, MICH. B.J., Jan. 2008, at 20, 23 (noting that part of professionalism 
training must include the concept of a lawyer as a citizen of the United States).  
100  See Kathleen Clark, The Legacy of Watergate for Legal Ethics Instruction, 51 
HASTINGS L.J. 673, 676 (2000) (“[A] student needs to engage not just her intellect, as she 
might in puzzling out the intricacies of federal jurisdiction, but she must also engage her 
heart, to determine how she will feel in a professional situation she may face.”).  
101  It should be noted, of course, that clinical and externship faculty have often worked 
on these matters more intentionally than other parts of the typical law school faculty. 
However, the goal of this Article is also to be helpful in clinic and externship programs, since 
the framework provided here could also be helpful in those contexts. 
102  Denise Platfoot Lacey, Embedding Professionalism into Legal Education, 18 J.L. 
BUS. & ETHICS 41, 46 (2012). 
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B. Attempts to “Teach” Formation of Professional Identity 
One methodology we have seen in recent years is a proliferation of 
additional programs that address attorney behavior and 
professionalism.103 Many schools have added programs—outside of the 
ethics course—in which practitioners and judges have mostly talked at 
students about how important professional behavior is.104 Until the fall of 
2014, my own school was no exception; we developed a program that took 
most of the day on a Saturday in the fall semester.105 It mostly involved 
local practitioners for whom this is an important topic or judges who are 
sick of resolving disputes between overly-litigious attorneys, lecturing 
about how awful badly-behaved attorneys are and how these students 
should not be like that when they graduate.106 There is scant evidence that 
such programs have value. Indeed, when they are asked, students often 
say they perceived them as having little impact.107 This may be because 
such programs do not engage the student in the personal contextual 
thinking process necessary for ethical formation.108 
Better than these one-day programs is the emergence of 
professionalism and ethical formation courses in a handful of innovative 
schools across the country. These fall into two main categories—first-year 
required courses and upper-level electives. 
Some schools now require in the first year of law school a specialized 
course designed to introduce new students to what lawyers do and the 
obligations they have. An example of this is the course at the University 
of St. Thomas School of Law that explores the legal system and the values 
of lawyers, including the moral and ethical dimensions—which requires 
                                                     
103  For a recent study of professionalism education in American law schools, see 
generally Kehner & Robinson, supra note 97. 
104  See Lacey, supra note 102, at 45–46 (noting examples of schools adding 
professionalism events into law school programs). 
105  See Event Agenda at For This We Stand, Joint 1L Professionalism Orientation 
Event (Sept. 15, 2012) (on file with the Regent University Law Review) (outlining the 
schedule for a one-day professionalism program at the University of Denver Sturm College 
of Law). 
106  See id. 
107  E.g., E-mail from Student 1 to author (Feb. 23, 2015, 04:06 PM) (on file with the 
Regent University Law Review) (used with permission) (likening a professionalism event to 
a glorified legal rumor mill); E-mail from Student 2 to author (Feb. 23, 2015, 11:48 AM) (on 
file with the Regent University Law Review) (used with permission) (considering a 
professionalism event a waste of time). 
108  See Dwane L. Tinsley, President’s Page, Ethical Is the Best Policy, W. VA. LAW., 
Jan.–Mar. 2009, at 4, 5 (“Legal ethics require lawyers to make contextual, discretionary, 
ethical judgments.”).  
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students to begin reflecting on these issues.109 Another example is the 
required first-year course taught at the University of North Dakota School 
of Law called Professional Foundations, or “ProfFound” for short. This 
course 
explicitly asks students to engage in studied self-reflection about twelve 
core professional qualities of a “good lawyer,” including attributes such 
as adaptability, diligence, courage, honesty, humility, integrity, loyalty, 
and patience. The course explores these qualities through life-like 
lawyering scenarios that implicate their meaning and application, and 
ask students to confront the questions “What would I do or how would 
I feel as a lawyer dealing with those issues in these particular 
situations?”110 
These are both good examples of first-year required courses that 
attempt to foster the Carnegie third apprenticeship. But many schools will 
not want to dedicate the time and effort to offering a course like this in 
the first year. Instead, some schools have chosen to allow interested 
faculty to offer an upper-level elective with similar educational goals. 
An example of an innovative upper-level course that immerses 
students in opportunities for professional formation is the course entitled 
Advanced Legal Ethics: Finding Joy and Satisfaction in the Legal Life, 
which was developed over a decade ago and taught by Professor Daisy 
Hurst Floyd at Mercer School of Law.111 In this course, Professor Floyd 
asks her upper-level students to reflect in writing on what they think will 
make them better lawyers (beyond the assumption of competence) and 
how those qualities relate to their notions of the profession of law.112 
Second, Professor Floyd’s students write a reflection on times in their lives 
when they have felt most alive and whether they expect they will ever be 
able to feel like that when they are practicing law.113 These assignments 
are atypical compared to what most students are asked to do in most law 
school classes.114 
                                                     
109  Neil W. Hamilton et al., Empirical Evidence That Legal Education Can Foster 
Student Professionalism/Professional Formation to Become an Effective Lawyer, 10 U. ST. 
THOMAS L.J. 11, 31 (2012) (describing the first-year course entitled Foundations of Justice 
at the University of St. Thomas School of Law). 
110  Professors Alleva & McGinniss Present on Professional Foundations at the AALS 
2015 Annual Meeting, U. N.D. SCH. L., http://law.und.edu/faculty/news/2015/alleva-
mcginniss-aals.cfm (last visited Apr. 11, 2015). 
111  Daisy Hurst Floyd, Dean and Univ. Professor of Law & Ethical Formation, Walter 
F. George Sch. of Law, Curriculum Vitae 4, available at http://law.mercer.edu/mu-
law/faculty/directory/hurst-floyd/upload/Floyd_Daisy_CV.pdf (showing that Dean Floyd 
taught Advanced Legal Ethics with Steven J. Keeva in the fall of 2001). 
112  WILLIAM M. SULLIVAN & MATTHEW S. ROSIN, A NEW AGENDA FOR HIGHER 
EDUCATION 56 (2008). 
113  Id. 
114  See id. at 57. 
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Professor Cliff Zimmerman teaches another example of an 
upper- level course addressing these issues at Northwestern University 
School of Law.115 In that course, Professor Zimmerman asks his students 
to write their own personal narrative, believing that the process of 
connecting with their stories will help them to reconnect with their 
personal identity.116 After that foundational step, he asks his students to 
read and talk about personal moral codes, the ethics of storytelling, the 
ethics of counseling and interviewing, and multiple ethics-based 
challenging situations to learn more about how they will react when the 
situations are real.117 All of the course assignments are reflective in 
nature, and they culminate in a final paper containing a student’s 
interview of an attorney about her professional development and identity 
as well as the student’s reflection on his own law school experience and 
the development of his professional identity.118 
Both Professors Floyd and Zimmerman have noted that, early on in 
their courses, it is sometimes difficult to get law students to “open up” to 
these different sorts of learning experiences.119 So much of law school is 
about very different sorts of subjects and in very different learning 
environments.120 As a result, students are sometimes taken aback that 
professors care about these matters and want to help them develop in 
these areas. Generally, students warm up to the approach and value it 
over the course of the semester, but this may be because they have self-
selected into the course. It may also be because the professors have highly 
developed skills for teaching in this way. 
Other pedagogical methods are being used and tested in other 
courses. In an Interviewing and Counseling course, Professor Lisa Bliss 
puts cards in a jar from which students pick one card.121 On the cards are 
                                                     
115  Cliff Zimmerman, Legal Professionalism and Narrative Syllabus (Spring 2013), 
available at http://www.lawschool2.org/files/syllabus-4-1-13.docx.  
116  See id. 
117  See id. 
118  See id. (indicating that students’ assignments require exploring a formative 
moment in life, building lists of traits identifiable in good professionals, and discussing 
material with guest speakers). 
119  See SULLIVAN & ROSIN, supra note 112, at 59; David Thomson, Presentation at the 
Applied Storytelling Conference, L. SCH. 2.0 (Aug. 1, 2013, 12:40 PM), 
http://www.lawschool2.org/ls2/2013/08/presentation-at-the-applied-storytelling-
conference.html (outlining a presentation in which Professor Zimmerman described his 
students’ coursework in his Legal Professionalism and Narrative class). 
120  Jess M. Krannich et. al., Beyond “Thinking Like a Lawyer” and the Traditional 
Legal Paradigm: Toward a Comprehensive View of Legal Education, 86 DENV. U. L. REV. 
381, 386 (2009) (noting that within the first year of law school students are “initiated into a 
distinctive method of thinking that will forever alter the way they analyze disputes”).  
121  Lisa Bliss, Dir. of Experiential Educ., Co-Dir. of Health Law P’ship Legal Servs. 
Clinic, Ga. State Univ. Coll. of Law, Helping Students Cultivate Awareness and Sensitivity 
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descriptions of particular clients, their emotions, and their attitudes; 
students get to role-play both a client and the lawyer working with that 
client.122 This supports that aspect of professional formation that values 
the building of empathy for different client backgrounds and needs.  
Some of this sort of professional formation has been happening in the 
first year of law school, although perhaps not intentionally.123 The first-
year lawyering class entered the curriculum approximately thirty years 
ago.124 Since then, the pedagogy of the course has grown and matured, and 
a great deal of significant scholarship has been published about how to 
teach it well, develop its learning outcomes, and conduct effective 
assessment.125 
While the course is still titled “Legal Research and Writing” in some 
schools, most faculty members who teach in this area consider this to no 
longer be a representative term for what is now addressed by this course 
(although it does include both of those subjects).126 Some schools have 
changed the name of the course; at the University of Denver, it is known 
as “Lawyering Process.”127 This title, given to the course in a pioneering 
step by the law faculty in 1990, is intentionally descriptive of what the 
                                                     
to Client Emotions and Attitudes and the Role that Client Emotions and Attitudes Play in 
Client Decision-Making, Discussion at Southeastern Association of Law Schools 2014 
Annual Conference 12, 14 (Aug. 7, 2014) (on file with the Regent University Law Review) 
(including a description of Professor Bliss’s course). 
122  Id. at 14.  
123  See Kehner & Robinson, supra note 97, at 85–87. 
124  See, e.g., Paul Brest, A First-Year Course in the “Lawyering Process,” 32 J. LEGAL 
EDUC. 344, 344 (1982). 
125  See, e.g., Daniel L. Barnett, Triage in the Trenches of the Legal Writing Course: The 
Theory and Methodology of Analytical Critique, 38 U. TOL. L. REV. 651, 653–54 (2007); 
Kristen K. Davis, Designing and Using Peer Review in a First-Year Legal Research and 
Writing Course, 9 LEGAL WRITING 1, 2 (2003); Susan J. Hankin, Bridging Gaps and Blurring 
Lines: Integrating Analysis, Writing, Doctrine, and Theory, 17 LEGAL WRITING 325, 326 
(2011); Soma R. Kedia, Redirecting the Scope of First-Year Writing Courses: Toward a New 
Paradigm of Teaching Legal Writing, 87 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 147, 149–50 (2010); Ellie 
Margolis & Susan L. DeJarnatt, Moving Beyond Product to Process: Building a Better LRW 
Program, 46 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 93, 93–94 (2005); David S. Romantz, The Truth About 
Cats and Dogs: Legal Writing Courses and the Law School Curriculum, 52 U. KAN. L. REV. 
105, 107 (2003); Lucia Ann Silecchia, Legal Skills Training in the First Year of Law School: 
Research? Writing? Analysis? Or More?, 100 DICK. L. REV. 245, 250–52 (1996).  
126  See, e.g., Legal Research and Writing, STANFORD L. SCH., 
https://www.law.stanford.edu/courses/legal-research-and-writing (last visited Apr. 10, 
2015); Legal Research and Writing Program Overview, GEORGE WASHINGTON U., 
http://www.law.gwu.edu/Academics/EL/LRW/Pages/Overview.aspx (last visited Apr. 10, 
2015); Oregon’s LRW Curriculum, U. OR., http://law.uoregon.edu/lrw/overview/#overview 
(last visited Apr. 10, 2015). 
127  Academics: Experiential Learning, U. DENVER STURM C. L., 
http://www.law.du.edu/index.php/academics/experiential-learning (last visited Apr. 10, 
2015). 
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course addresses and how it does so.128 It is taught almost entirely with 
simulated client problems, and is designed to introduce first-year students 
broadly to the process that lawyers go through to do their jobs.129 This 
process includes client interviewing, statute and case reading, legal 
analysis, legal research, and several forms of legal expression, including 
legal writing, contract drafting, and oral advocacy.130 Despite being 
focused on developing these fundamental professional skills, many 
lawyering faculty may have been caught up short by the Carnegie Report’s 
focus on the third apprenticeship. While lawyering faculty members 
regularly address issues of professionalism in their classes, they have not 
traditionally offered intentional opportunities for their students to form 
their professional identities. This is changing, and increasingly an 
additional item on the already long list of learning outcomes for the 
lawyering class is to offer intentional opportunities for professional 
formation.131 
C. What Remains Unaddressed 
Despite these encouraging courses and teaching methods, not many 
schools are engaged in this sort of intentional professional identity 
formation, and those that do are still not addressing all of our students. A 
recent ABA Curricular Survey indicates that where such opportunities 
have been made available, they are mostly in upper-level electives.132 In 
another study of the professionalism-related course offerings in American 
law schools, the authors found that professionalism instruction exists 
(however that might be defined by the survey respondent) in only sixteen 
percent of doctrinal courses.133 
But perhaps more importantly, there are significant limitations to 
the current attempts to teach formation of professional identity however 
well-designed and intentioned they are. Because the nature of 
professional formation is interwoven with personal formation, these 
specialized courses by nature must be small. The first-year courses are 
difficult to implement across the first-year class, and where they have 
been implemented (University of St. Thomas, Mercer), they required a 
                                                     
128  PHILIP E. GAUTHIER, LAWYERS FROM DENVER 199–200 (1995). 
129  See id. 
130  See, e.g., David Thomson, Contract Drafting Exercise in Lawyering Process (Spring 
2015) (on file with the Regent University Law Review); David Thomson, Oral Argument 
Assignments in Lawyering Process (Spring 2014) (on file with the Regent University Law 
Review). 
131  See Kehner & Robinson, supra note 97, at 71 & n.62, 72 (giving examples of 
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132  See 2002–2010 A.B.A. Curricular Survey, supra note 25, at 16. 
133  Kehner & Robinson, supra note 97, at 85–86. 
2015] “TEACHING” FORMATION OF PROFESSIONAL IDENTITY 323 
broad institutional commitment to the work; indeed, it became integrated 
into the school’s culture—no easy task to achieve.134 First-year students 
are also being pushed and pulled in many different directions in their 
other courses, and that makes it a difficult time to devote so much time to 
these concepts. Further, because the nature of professional formation 
requires the ethical rules as a reference point, it is at least not ideal for 
students to grapple with these issues without having taken the required 
course in ethics. 
More concerning, however, is that even though these courses use 
problems set in the context of practice, they are non-contextual for all 
students. So much of professional formation is localized in the area of 
practice of the graduate. Criminal defense attorneys have a different 
professional identity than corporate law attorneys in a large law firm.135 
If a student who wants to be a prosecutor takes one of these courses and 
all the contextual problems are not in criminal law, then he is still without 
the tools he needs for ethical formation in his area of practice. So while 
the first-year work endeavors to be contextual, it cannot cover all areas of 
practice and is not likely to be highly transferrable, or at least not as 
transferrable as we would like. What is needed is the taking up of such 
matters in the courses where students are taking their concentration and 
ensuring that they are taken up in the context of ethical issues that arise 
in that area of law practice. However, none of these limitations is meant 
as an argument against such first-year courses. They are just not enough. 
Another worry is that such courses could allow the remainder of the 
faculty—those who are not engaged in these forms of education—to think 
that it is being taken care of elsewhere. But of course, the Carnegie 
Report’s most fundamental recommendation was that the third 
apprenticeship be integrated throughout the curriculum.136 
Indeed, perhaps the greatest concern about these efforts is that they 
are piecemeal—they do not ultimately achieve the goal of integration of 
the three apprenticeships across the curriculum. Professional formation 
not only needs to be contextual, but it also needs to be regular and 
repeated. As William Sullivan has written, “[m]ost importantly, when 
ethical professional practices and standards are enacted over and over in 
                                                     
134  See, e.g., Hamilton et al., supra note 109, at 29 (“[F]aculty members . . . create[d] a 
curriculum and a culture in which each student can develop the knowledge and skills 
essential to becoming an excellent lawyer while also forming an ethical professional identity 
integrated with the student’s faith and moral compass.”). 
135  See Robert Rubinson, Professional Identity as Advocacy, 31 MISS. C. L. REV. 7, 9 
(2012). Typically, large law firms have a professional identity with “no moral or political 
spin,” just opposition to another large organization. Id. By contrast, “criminal defense 
attorneys and prosecutors assume mythical roles of good against evil, both seeking to bear 
the mantle of truth and justice.” Id. at 26–27. 
136  See supra text accompanying note 54. 
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the course of training, students develop habits of heart and mind that 
shape their approach to their work for years to come.”137 
The nature of identity itself requires regular and repeated formation 
opportunities. Carrie Yang Costello is a sociologist who had prior training 
and practice experience as a lawyer, and she has written a book about 
professional identity formation in training for two professions (one of 
which is law). In her book, Professor Costello notes that “our identities are 
like icebergs. The large bulk of them lies invisible to us below the surface 
of consciousness, while only a small part of them are [sic] perceptible to 
our conscious minds.”138 The non-conscious bulk of identity is referred to 
by sociologists as “habitus.”139 This includes taste, body language, and 
emotional identity.140 When one’s habitus is in dissonance with the 
professional identity of one’s chosen profession, this leads in most cases to 
difficulty having success in the profession or added physical stress—and 
often both.141 Only through repeated efforts to reconcile the two—or 
through finding a sub-specialty in the law that fits one’s personal identity 
better than most others and working to reconcile that—is one likely to 
reduce the dissonance between one’s identity and one’s profession. For 
these reasons, it is important to “consistently emphasize the development 
of professional identity and purpose throughout.”142 
It is worth noting that law schools with a religious affiliation may 
have a head start in efforts to promote the formation of professional 
identity.143 The University of St. Thomas School of Law is the home of the 
Holloran Center for Ethical Leadership in the Professions.144 The school 
and Center, within a Catholic university, have been leaders in developing 
courses and teaching methodologies for professional formation.145 And 
Regent University School of Law, host of this symposium on professional 
                                                     
137  Colby & Sullivan, supra note 5, at 421; see also CARNEGIE REPORT, supra note 1, 
at 191–92 (noting that the three apprenticeships—the cognitive, the practical, and the 
ethical-social—should be consistently integrated in law school curricula). 
138  CARRIE YANG COSTELLO, PROFESSIONAL IDENTITY CRISIS: RACE, CLASS, GENDER, 
AND SUCCESS AT PROFESSIONAL SCHOOLS 20 (2005). For a brief discussion of the 
psychological concept of personal identity, see supra note 50. 
139  COSTELLO, supra note 138.  
140  Id. at 20–22. 
141  See id. at 23. 
142  Colby & Sullivan, supra note 5, at 423. 
143  Jeffrey A. Brauch, Faith-Based Law Schools and an Apprenticeship in Professional 
Identity, 42 U. TOL. L. REV. 593, 598 (2011) (“Faith-based law schools are well-positioned to 
provide the professional identity training that Carnegie finds generally lacking in legal 
education today.”). 
144  See HOLLORAN CENTER FOR ETHICAL LEADERSHIP PROFS., 
http://www.stthomas.edu/hollorancenter/ (last visited Apr. 10, 2015).  
145  Id.; The Vision of a Catholic College in the Midwest, U. ST. THOMAS, 
http://www.stthomas.edu/aboutust/mission/ (last visited Apr. 10, 2015).  
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identity, is part of a faith-based university that provides an education 
“rooted in a Christian perspective.”146 At these schools, discussions around 
faith and morality are connected to their missions and are a part of their 
cultures.147 To a large extent, their students self-select to these 
institutions because they already have a personal identity that is formed, 
at least in part, by the belief system that is consonant with the school’s 
mission.148 At law schools without such a foundation or culture, 
professional formation discussions are more likely to be met with 
skepticism.149 In the Carnegie Foundation’s study of clergy education, it 
was noted that “[m]any theological schools are more self-conscious about 
their reliance on the formative influences of the school’s cultural 
practices . . . . [F]ormative communities of practice [are] a central 
mechanism of the third apprenticeship in theological education.”150 
“Unfortunately,” William Sullivan has noted, “the kind of intentionality 
with regard to campus culture as a formative mechanism that we see in 
clergy education is rare in most other professional schools.”151 
III. TEACHING METHODOLOGIES FOR THE THIRD APPRENTICESHIP 
A. The Value of Simulations for the Third Apprenticeship 
What is becoming clear is that we need to not simply lecture about 
professional formation, but instead create realistic “situations” in which 
our students can be confronted with ethical questions, reflect on the 
decisions they make, and be guided by us as they form their own 
                                                     
146  Regent Univeristy Law Review Symposium Schedule, REGENT U. SCH. L., 
http://www.regent.edu/acad/schlaw/student_life/studentorgs/lawreview/symposiumschedule
.cfm (listing the events for a legal symposium titled “Raising the Bar: How Developing a 
Professional Identity Can Help You Break the Negative Lawyer Stereotype”) (last visited 
Apr. 10, 2015); Why Regent, REGENT U., http://success.regent.edu/index.php (last visited Apr. 
10, 2015). 
147  Brauch, supra note 143, at 602 (noting that, at Regent University School of Law, 
professional identity is a focus both inside and outside the classroom).  
148  E.g., Testimonials, CENTER FOR ETHICAL FORMATION AND LEGAL EDUC. REFORM, 
http://www.regent.edu/acad/schlaw/programs/cef/testimonials.cfm (last visited Apr. 10, 
2015) (“I knew that Regent was going to not only equip me academically and professionally, 
but it is also supportive of my values, viewing law as a means [of] glorifying God with our 
talents and knowledge.”); see also The Regent Law Difference, REGENT U. SCH. L., 
http://www.regent.edu/acad/schlaw/whyregentlaw/whyregentlaw.cfm (last visited Apr. 10, 
2015) (recruiting students interested in legal education based on “eternal principles of truth 
and justice [that] inform the way we should teach, study, and practice law”). 
149  See LAW SCH. SURVEY OF STUDENT ENGAGEMENT, LSSSE LAW SCHOOL REPORT 
2014: REGENT UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 120 (2014) (identifying that 84.5% of Regent 3L’s 
claim their law school experience “quite a bit” or “very much” helped them to develop a 
personal code of values and ethics, compared to only 54.3% of 3L’s nationwide).  
150  Colby & Sullivan, supra note 5, at 417. 
151  Id. 
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professional identities. Seminars dedicated to creating space for 
professional reflection and formation serve an important role, but 
formation clearly needs to be repeated and regular throughout the 
curriculum.152 What is needed is a methodology where this can take place 
in any subject-matter focused “doctrinal” course. 
Fortunately, we already have that methodology—we just need to use 
it more. Teaching legal doctrine through simulations is a powerful and 
effective way of enabling professional formation because it is done in the 
context of the area of practice.153 The Carnegie Report noted:  
While simulated practice can be an important site for developing skills 
and understandings essential for practice, it can also provide the setting 
for teaching the ethical demands of practice. Lawyering courses that 
use simulation of client interviewing and counseling, for example, 
permit the introduction of ethical as well as technical problems in a 
setting that mimics for the student the unpredictable challenges of 
actual practice.154 
Indeed, teaching through simulations is becoming more common in other 
forms of professional education, particularly medical education: “It is 
instructive to note that . . . medical education has been moving heavily 
into the use of simulation.”155 Of course, medical education is different 
from legal education in many important ways, but the trend in medical 
education is “suggestive that increased use of the pedagogy of simulation 
is likely to prove a boon to teaching both practical skills and ethical-social 
development. Ethical engagement has practical dimensions that are more 
fully evident and can be examined and taught in conditions that simulate 
practice rather than in conventional classrooms.”156 
As has been noted, the Carnegie Report recommends that more 
courses be designed to provide the learning of doctrine in the context of 
practice and to present the legal principles in such a way that students 
are exposed to situations that allow them to begin to form their identities 
as legal professionals.157 Simulated practice experiences delivered through 
doctrinal simulations are ideal for this. 
The question then becomes what those “situations” might look like. 
This Article offers a framework for contextual formation that should be 
applicable across the curriculum, from doctrinal classes to clinics. It 
involves a combination of guided steps that ideally take place in a 
particular order, called a Guidance Sequence for Formation of 
Professional Identity (GSFPI). 
                                                     
152  See sources cited supra note 137. 
153  CARNEGIE REPORT, supra note 1, at 158–59. 
154  Id. at 158. 
155  Id. at 159. 
156  Id. 
157  Id. at 195–97. 
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The sequence has four essential components: (1) a client 
representation, an exercise, or a writing assignment that presents an 
ethical dilemma as it appears in practice; (2) an identification by the 
student of the ethical quandary raised in completing the work; (3) a 
written expression by the student of the ethical issue as well as his 
reflection on his own decisions about how he resolved the dilemma; and 
(4) some form of written or oral feedback from the professor about the 
decisions and choices the student made and the quality and depth of the 
identification and reflection offered.158 
This could be accomplished fairly easily in any clinic, externship, or 
simulation-based course, but there is no reason it could not also be 
accomplished in a traditional doctrinal course as well. It could be a 
separate assignment in the course, with a portion of the grade assigned to 
it. The feedback from the professor is more time-consuming in a large 
class, but not impossible with a well-designed rubric. Offering such 
situations for students to engage with regularly throughout the course is 
ideal, and a whole-course simulation is the best form of this teaching. Still, 
if such methodologies were employed even once in every (or even most) 
doctrinal courses, it would go a long way to achieve the goals of the 
Carnegie Report’s intended integration. 
In the Discovery Law class that I teach (a simulation-based class that 
is discussed in greater detail below), every discovery document the 
students prepare—and serve on their assigned opposing counsel—offers 
opportunities for identification of ethical issues, and the memos that 
accompany each assignment specifically ask the students to explain the 
choices they made and reflect on how and why they made those 
decisions.159 In the final step of the sequence, I provide margin feedback 
on their memos, and one of the criteria in the grading rubric on each 
assignment addresses the accuracy and quality of the identification of the 
ethical issue as well as the depth and clarity of the reflection.160 
Legal research and writing (LRW) professors should be working on 
how to introduce such GSFPI opportunities in the first-year course for 
three reasons. First, the Carnegie Report suggests that the formation of 
professional identity should be infused throughout the curriculum,161 and 
                                                     
158  This discussion of a GSFPI has been adapted from my blog; for more, see David 
Thomson, “Teaching” Formation of Professional Identity, L. SCH. 2.0 (July 24, 2012, 1:46 PM), 
http://www.lawschool2.org/ls2/2012/07/formation-of-professional-identity.html. 
159  See David Thomson, Discovery Practicum Syllabus 1 (Spring 2015) (on file with 
the Regent University Law Review). 
160  See David Thomson, Discovery Practice Grading Rubric: Deposition (on file with 
the Regent University Law Review); David Thomson, Discovery Practice Grading Rubric: 
Requesting Document (on file with the Regent University Law Review); David Thomson, 
Discovery Practice Grading Rubric: Responsive Document [hereinafter Thomson, Responsive 
Document Rubric] (on file with the Regent University Law Review). 
161  See CARNEGIE REPORT, supra note 1, at 191–92. 
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obviously that would include LRW. Second, because LRW professors 
already do some of this (just not necessarily intentionally) and their class 
is the first one that law students take which simulates legal practice, it is 
important for the LRW class to introduce concepts of formation of 
professional identity. Third, it would give LRW professors opportunities 
for more connections with other parts of the curriculum working on 
formation of professional identity, most particularly the clinic and the 
externship program. 
Fortunately, it should not be difficult to do. Perhaps one way might 
be to have an ethical dilemma arise about whether to include a borderline 
negative case in a brief. That is a writing assignment that already exists 
in the LRW course, and sometimes this does happen.162 But LRW 
professors do not necessarily ask the students to identify and reflect on 
the choice they made about that case, and as a result, they might miss an 
opportunity for response and guidance to the students, which would 
complete each of the steps in a GSFPI. With a modicum of intention and 
planning, this sort of exercise could be accomplished in many courses 
currently in the law school curriculum. 
At the University of Denver, we developed a model for upper class 
simulations that are designed to achieve the Carnegie Report’s call for 
integration of the three apprenticeships.163 This model, known as Carnegie 
Integrated Courses, is designed to integrate doctrine, skills, and 
professional identity formation in any law school course.164 Typically 
taught in a simulation format, it can be applied to any legal doctrinal 
subject.165 These courses can often provide necessary skills in a safe 
environment, and they can serve to prepare students to take a clinical 
course next, perhaps followed by an externship experience. 
It is likely that these sorts of whole-course simulations—courses that 
intentionally integrate the three apprenticeships and use a systematic 
approach such as the GSFPI—may be the best pedagogy for the 
development of the third apprenticeship in our students. This is so 
because students learn the doctrine in the context that they apply it, so 
                                                     
162  See ASS’N OF LEGAL WRITING DIRS., LEGAL WRITING INST., REPORT OF THE ANNUAL 
LEGAL WRITING SURVEY iv (2010), available at http://www.alwd.org/wp-
content/uploads/2013/02/2010-survey-results.pdf. 
163  Compare Course Simulations: Carnegie Integrated Courses, U. DENVER STURM C. 
L., http://www.law.du.edu/index.php/experiential-advantage/course-simulations (last 
visited Apr. 10, 2015) [hereinafter Carnegie Integrated Courses] (describing the Carnegie 
Integrated Courses, which are mostly simulation-based and practice-oriented), with 
CARNEGIE REPORT, supra note 1, at 12 (suggesting law schools adopt curricula that integrate 
the three apprenticeships throughout). The Carnegie Report also suggested that models for 
integration of the apprenticeships already existed in the legal writing programs of many law 
schools. CARNEGIE REPORT, supra note 1, at 104. 
164  Carnegie Integrated Courses, supra note 163. 
165  Id. 
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they are confronted with ethical issues as they arise in practice, and they 
must resolve them to complete the assignment and reflect on their 
formation. While clinical and externship opportunities do this as well, it 
is impossible in those live-client representations to expose students to as 
many of the ethical issues that arise as can be done in the safer 
environment of a simulation. 
Further, a simulation that places students in role relationships to 
each other—such as opposing counsel—creates a built-in normative 
benefit. Generally speaking, students are not willing to submit documents 
to each other that would be so sloppy or late as to inhibit the learning 
experience for their classmates. This might create a normative behavioral 
benefit: if their first experience (and then repeated experience) is in the 
mode and expectation of professional behavior, perhaps that will inculcate 
such behaviors and values as they enter practice. 
B. The Value of Experiential Learning for the Third Apprenticeship 
There has been much discussion in legal education recently about the 
benefits of experiential learning as a pedagogical design. Schools across 
the country have been expanding their experiential offerings, and the 
ABA has recently required that law schools increase these offerings.166 But 
there remains some confusion about what experiential learning actually 
entails and why it can be so beneficial for student learning and 
formation.167 
My recent article offered a history and background for experiential 
learning and provided a new definition of experiential learning which 
intentionally includes opportunities for professional formation:168 
The term “Experiential Learning” refers to methods of instruction 
that regularly or primarily place students in the role of attorneys, 
whether through simulations, clinics, or externships. Such forms of 
instruction integrate theory and practice by providing numerous 
opportunities for students to learn and apply lawyering skills as they 
are used in legal practice (or similar professional settings). These 
learning opportunities are also designed to encourage students to begin 
to form their professional identities as lawyers, through experience or 
role-playing with guided self-reflection, so that they can become skilled, 
ethical, and professional life-long learners of the law.169 
There are several essential attributes of this definition that deserve 
highlighting. Experiential learning must focus on the students’ 
                                                     
166  See David I. C. Thomson, Defining Experiential Legal Education, 1 J. 
EXPERIENTIAL LEARNING 1, 5 (2014). 
167  See id.  
168  Id. at 19–20. 
169  Id. at 20. 
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experience, place students in the role of attorneys, intentionally emphasize 
the formation of professional identity, and effectively communicate to 
students that the concepts learned in law school are merely the foundation 
to their ever-expanding knowledge of the legal practice.170 
This definition can be made to apply to many different contexts, but 
one must ask several questions to pinpoint its application to a particular 
course.171 One of these questions is focused on the third apprenticeship: 
“Do you include opportunities for student self-reflection (in writing) about 
the experience of being ‘in role’ so as to help them form their professional 
identities as lawyers?”172 By asking this question, a professor can 
determine whether he has adequately planned for the formation of 
professional identity in his students through opportunities of student 
reflection. Although self-reflection is not required by the definition, a 
course that plans these opportunities meets at least one of the goals of 
experiential education. Obviously, courses without opportunities for 
students to reflect, but with other structures in place for students to form 
their professional identities, can still be classified as “experiential.”173 This 
could also be true of virtually any course in the law school curriculum. Any 
course could incorporate one or more GSFPI designed modules that fit the 
substantive area of law being taught. It is also possible to do this 
throughout a course, and what follows is an example of that sort of course 
design. 
IV. AN EXAMPLE COURSE IN DISCOVERY LAW 
For over twenty years (on and off), I have taught a Civil Discovery 
Litigation course that is a whole-course simulation and which uses the 
GSFPI method for the intentional formation of professional identity. A 
typical pre-trial course might be thought of as just a skills course, leaving 
to some other course the teaching of the applicable doctrine. Most schools 
do not have a course focused just on civil discovery law, in part because it 
is believed that the subject is sufficiently covered in the first-year Civil 
                                                     
170  See id. John Dewey emphasized teaching students how to learn, saying,  
Collateral learning in the way of formation of enduring attitudes . . . may be and 
often is much more important that the spelling lesson or lesson in geography or 
history that is learned. For these attitudes are fundamentally what count in the 
future. The most important attitude that can be formed is that of desire to go on 
learning. 
JOHN DEWEY, EXPERIENCE AND EDUCATION 48 (1938). 
171  See Thomson, supra note 166, at 21–22. 
172  Id. at 22. 
173  Trial Practice is an example. See id. at 23. Practice-heavy courses like this would 
require only a bit of planning to transform them into explicitly formative courses. Id. 
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Procedure course.174 Unfortunately, while all students take that course in 
the first year, they rarely learn much of the detail of the discovery phase 
in a civil litigation during that course. A typical Civil Procedure casebook 
contains 1200 pages and allocates but eighty pages to the discovery 
rules.175 While some courses might direct some effort at those rules, the 
overwhelming focus of the first-year course is on such mainstream topics 
as jurisdiction, venue, pleading, and the Erie doctrine.176 This is done for 
two primary reasons. First, those are subjects that can be tested on a final 
exam more substantively than the discovery rules can be tested, and 
second, because those are topics tested on the bar exam.177 This is all 
understandable (and perhaps even appropriate), but it creates a problem: 
a law school graduate going into a litigation practice will have a good 
grounding in those subjects that can be tested on a summative exam but 
will rarely have any idea how to actually draft a set of interrogatories or 
understand why one would want to. 
The Discovery Practice course is focused on the doctrine of the twelve 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure that govern discovery.178 While one could 
teach such a course in a “traditional” format, with lectures and a final 
exam, such a structure would not address the Carnegie Report’s concerns 
about proper use of the upper-level years in law school and the integration 
of doctrine, skills, and professional identity formation.179 Therefore, the 
structure of this course is set fully around a simulated litigation that takes 
place during the course, led by the students in teams of two.180 Each team 
of two students is simulating the same litigation, so there are eight to ten 
versions of the case going on in each administration of the course.181 In 
such a course design, students learn about Rule 33,182 for example, by 
studying the Interrogatories to Parties rule itself, discussing key cases 
that interpret it, and learning various strategies for how and when to use 
interrogatories in litigation. Then the students prepare a set of 
                                                     
174  See Arin Greenwood, School of E-Discovery: Online Course Aims to Help Lawyers 
Bone Up, A.B.A. J., Apr. 2011, at 30, 30 (noting that lawyers and law students have limited 
access to courses on e-discovery). 
175  See, e.g., RICHARD L. MARCUS ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE: A MODERN APPROACH, at 
ix–xi (5th ed. 2009).  
176  See, e.g., id. at ix–x. 
177  See NAT’L CONFERENCE OF BAR EXAM’RS, MBE SUBJECT MATTER OUTLINE 1 (2014), 
available at http://www.ncbex.org/assets/media_files/MBE/MBE-Subject-Matter-
Outline.pdf (including jurisdiction, venue, pleading, and law applied by federal courts as 
Civil Procedure topics tested on the MBE). 
178  Thomson, supra note 159. 
179  See CARNEGIE REPORT, supra note 1, at 12. 
180  See Thomson, supra note 159. 
181  See id. at 7. 
182  FED. R. CIV. P. 33. 
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interrogatories, and at the next class they serve their assigned opposing 
counsel the set that they have drafted.183 This continues throughout the 
course, and the students draft a dozen discovery documents, one per 
week.184 In this simulation course design there is still class time, of course, 
and there is doctrine to cover, but there are many more active learning 
methods of teaching that can be implemented. 
The problem set the students work on during the course is a product 
liability prescription drug case.185 It is an “ill-structured problem”186 in the 
sense that the case has a range of reasonable outcomes, although it is not 
entirely unpredictable how it is likely to turn out. At the beginning of the 
course, students are given a précis about the problem, a complaint and 
answer, and a portion of the case file.187 They spend the rest of the course 
learning about the rules, cases, and strategy in class, and then they use 
the discovery tools they have learned to find out the rest of the information 
that is available—just as in a real litigation.188 In this way, the students 
are producers of knowledge about the case, but there are also ways in 
which they produce the knowledge about the discovery rules they learn 
during the course. One of those ways is working in collaborative groups to 
research one of the lesser important rules of discovery law (such as Rule 
28—Persons Before Whom Depositions May Be Taken189) and present to 
the class what they have learned.190 There are five of these groups, and 
they each prepare a wiki-based research site and present in class from the 
site they have prepared. This way, other students have access to the sites 
on these rules to reference throughout the rest of the course. 
In the Discovery course, as with many other law school courses, 
students come into the class with well-formed notions of how the litigation 
system works or does not work, drawn mostly from popular media such as 
TV shows and movies. Typically, attorneys are depicted in the popular 
media as unethical sharks who use the litigation system for combat, often 
                                                     
183  See Thomson, supra note 159, at 3. 
184  See id. at 3–5. 
185  David I. C. Thomson, About S&V: Discovery Practice, DISCOVERY SKILLS, 
http://www.discoveryskills.com/aboutdp.htm (last visited Apr. 10, 2015) [hereinafter 
Thomson, About Discovery Practice]; see also Thomson, supra note 159, at 2. 
186  See David H. Jonassen, Instructional Design Models for Well-Structured and Ill-
Structured Problem-Solving Learning Outcomes, 45 EDUC. TECH. RES. & DEV. 65, 68 (1997); 
see also DAVID H. JONASSEN, LEARNING TO SOLVE PROBLEMS: AN INSTRUCTIONAL DESIGN 
GUIDE 4 (2004). 
187  These documents are provided in the assigned textbook. See Thomson, About 
Discovery Practice, supra note 185. 
188  See Thomson, supra note 159, at 1–5. 
189  FED. R. CIV. P. 28. 
190  See Thomson, supra note 159, at 4. 
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using it to unfairly overwhelm their opponents.191 The design of the 
Discovery course is to put students into nearly “real” situations wherein 
they must represent a client, work with an opposing counsel, conduct a 
deposition, and ultimately reach a settlement. Through these stages of the 
course, the students can see for themselves that—at least most of the 
time—it is not about “winning” the case for a client, but it is more about 
managing a process according to the governing rules and reaching an 
acceptable result for the client.192 
Because over ninety-eight percent of cases settle (at least in federal 
court), the course ends with a settlement negotiation, which the students 
conduct themselves with the professor only acting as a facilitator where 
needed.193 In some cases, the professor acts as a student attorney’s client 
(depending on which side the student is representing). Almost every time, 
students successfully settle the case within a fairly broad, but still 
reasonable, range of settlement terms. 
In a traditional course, the professor can lecture, explain, or tell war 
stories about the subject matter of the course. But when students learn on 
a metacognitive level through exercises such as a mock deposition or a 
settlement conference, they learn the subject of the course much more 
deeply, and often in a personal way.194 Further, the simulation puts them 
in situations where they have to begin to form their own professional 
identity and consider difficult questions such as “How will I behave in this 
situation as an attorney?” and “What kind of attorney do I want to be: an 
obstreperous one or a cooperative one?” or more simply: “What is my style 
of lawyering going to be?” 
Further, with each discovery document the students prepare through 
the course of the semester, they also prepare a “strategy and reflection” 
memo to the professor detailing their planned and attempted strategies in 
the particular document they drafted.195 In that memo, they also address 
the ethical issues they faced and how they resolved them.196 This feature 
of the course also provides an opportunity for metacognitive learning and 
further development of the students’ professional identity. 
As we learn more about assessment in law school, we have come to 
know that the more explicit we can be with our students about our 
                                                     
191  See Carrie Menkel-Meadow, The Sense and Sensibilities of Lawyers: Lawyering in 
Literature, Narratives, Film and Television, and Ethical Choices Regarding Career and 
Craft, 31 MCGEORGE L. REV. 1, 2–3 (1999). 
192  Any of these individual discovery modules could also be conducted in the first-year 
Civil Procedure course. 
193  See Thomson, supra note 159, at 1, 5. 
194  See CARNEGIE REPORT, supra note 1; see, e.g., Thomson, supra note 159. 
195  Thomson, supra note 159, at 7. 
196  Id. 
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learning outcomes for the course, the better their learning will be.197 
Therefore, because the formation of professional identity is a learning 
outcome I have for the course, I am explicit about that on the first page of 
the syllabus: 
[T]he learning objectives for this course are that, by the end of the 
course, you will be able to: 
 Recognize and apply the twelve Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
that pertain to discovery 
 Recognize how and when to use the most common litigation 
documents 
 Prepare such documents in a simulated litigation 
. . . . 
 Identify and evaluate ethical dilemmas that arise in the 
discovery context 
. . . . 
 Take and defend a deposition 
 Compare options and negotiate a settlement with opposing 
counsel 
. . . . 
 Use these opportunities to reflect intentionally on the formation 
of your professional identity.198 
Because a good discovery document does not necessarily reveal its 
strategy and goals to opposing counsel, I have students write a memo to 
me each week about each document they prepare.199 Those memos fit a 
model that I describe for the students as follows:  
The memos should address at least these three topics: 1) methods 
and approaches, 2) strategy, and 3) formation of professional identity. 
For the first topic, methods and approaches, please provide information 
about how you developed and prepared the document, such as your 
starting point and adjustments you made. For the second topic, please 
describe your strategy in preparing the document—what are you trying 
to learn from the opposing party, and why did you take the approach 
you did? For the third topic, formation of professional identity, please a) 
Identify any ethical issues you encountered in preparing the document, 
b) describe how you resolved those ethical issues, c) reflect on how the 
                                                     
197  Ciara O’Farrell, Enhancing Student Learning Through Assessment: A Toolkit 
Approach, DUBLIN INST. OF TECH. 8, available at http://www.tcd.ie/teaching-learning/
academic-development/assets/pdf/250309_assessment_toolkit.pdf (last visited Apr. 10, 
2015). 
198  Thomson, supra note 159 (including a slightly abbreviated set of the learning 
outcomes for the course). 
199  Id. at 8. 
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decision you made contributes to or is consistent with your own 
formation of professional identity as a lawyer.200 
Finally, the fourth step is to provide some feedback. As assessment 
professionals say, “[w]e should measure what we value,”201 so if we value 
this learning outcome, we must measure how the students are doing in 
their formation. Thus, twenty percent of the grade for each week’s 
assignment includes the following one-to-five scale: 
ETHICS / REFLECTION (20%)    
1 Identification of ethical issues is poor or lacking (such as objecting 
to answer a legitimately focused question). Document and memo 
seems mechanical and lacks reflection. 
2 A few ethical identification errors made. Document and memo show 
some thoughtful reflection. 
3 Only one or two ethical identification concerns in the document and 
memo. Some thoughtful reflection and clarity of purpose is shown in 
the document. 
4 No ethical identification concerns, and the document and 
accompanying memo show significant thoughtful reflection in 
preparing the document. 
5 This is a student who is becoming confident with discovery, 
identifies all ethical grey areas, and uses the simulation to reflect 
with depth and clarity on decisions made while balancing the 
various competing concerns.202 
It would be easy to think that students would not take this part of the 
assignments seriously. But quite the reverse is true. Here are a few 
examples of what students have said about their work on the discovery 
documents using this methodology: 
“The central ethical dilemma of discovery came into sharp focus 
during this exercise. I felt torn on several questions . . . . For each, I tried 
to imagine standing in front of a judge and explaining the choice I had 
made.”203 
“[W]hile I certainly could have phrased my interrogatories in a more 
aggressive manner . . . I chose not to. I felt it was more necessary to 
establish a generally amicable relationship with opposing counsel so that 
                                                     
200  These directions exemplify cultivating both technical skills and professional 
identity formation. David Thomson, Discovery Practicum Memo Instructions (on file with 
author). 
201  Robert Coe & Carol Taylor Fitz-Gibbon, School Effectiveness Research: Criticisms 
and Recommendations, 24 OXFORD REV. EDUC. 421, 433 (1998). 
202  Thomson, Responsive Document Rubric, supra note 160. 
203  Student 3, Memorandum of Strategy for Answers to Interrogatories (on file with 
the Regent University Law Review) (used with permission). 
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future discussions relate specifically to the main points of 
contention . . . .”204 
“I do not want lawyers, clients, or judges to perceive me as an 
attorney who walks too close to the unethical line, occasionally crossing it. 
However, I also want to protect my clients’ interests.”205 
These student reflections are quite typical, and they indicate that the 
regular guided sequences provided in this simulation course give students 
the opportunity to explore the personal meaning of the legal work they are 
planning to do and to begin to feel the weight of responsibility that comes 
with being a lawyer. 
CONCLUSION 
The Carnegie Report argues that the professionalism problem starts 
in law school and that it is not about mundane things like timeliness and 
respect for judges, but rather is founded in the professional identity of 
lawyers.206 Further, it suggests that professional identity is governed only 
at its base by the Model Rules but is mostly about notions of duty and 
responsibility to society and the rule of law upon which that society is 
based.207 The Carnegie Report called on law schools to give this third 
apprenticeship greater attention, focus, and intentionality, and to do so in 
a curriculum that integrates professional identity with the essential 
doctrinal knowledge and skills required to function as an attorney.208 
Some schools are working hard to address this call for reform in legal 
education.209 Innovative courses have been developed and taught to 
students in both the first year and upper-class years.210 Legal educators 
who have always addressed themselves to such matters (such as clinicians 
and legal writing professors) have become more intentional about what 
they are doing. 
However, this Article argues that there is much more to be done, and 
the call for integration has not yet been met. The barriers to achieving 
integration seem high, but they are not. Experiential learning 
opportunities are already expanding, and these learning environments 
are ideally suited to facilitate the professional formation of students. Even 
outside of experiential learning courses, modules that implement a guided 
                                                     
204  Student 4, Memorandum on Defendant’s Interrogatories (on file with the Regent 
University Law Review) (used with permission). 
205  Student 5, Plaintiff’s Response to Interrogatories (on file with the Regent 
University Law Review) (used with permission). 
206  See CARNEGIE REPORT, supra note 1. 
207  Id. at 129. 
208  Id. at 196. 
209  See sources cited supra note 39; see also text accompanying notes 143–51.  
210  See supra Part II.B. 
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sequence for professional identity formation can be fit into any course. 
This Article provides a methodology for doing so. 
When legal education achieves apprenticeship integration 
throughout the curriculum, it will have moved itself substantially forward 
in the direction of addressing its limitations. When this is achieved, the 
impact on the legal profession will likely be profound in ways that have 
long been desired. 
